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ICG Bosnia Project, 22 September, 1996
ELECTION DAY
Introduction
On 16 September, the Coordinator for International Monitoring (CIM) issued a preliminary report summarising the international observers' findings on election day. The report noted that despite the complexity of the ballots, voting throughout the country was "conducted properly at 97% of polling stations" and that "the Polling Station Committees conducted their work in a professional and impartial manner." However, CIM pointed to "three major areas of the election process in which significant problems occurred": voter registration, absentee polling stations, and freedom of movement. 91 (For more detailed description, see below). Voting was completed the same day as scheduled. Some polling stations had few voters and remained virtually empty all day. Others were overcrowded and unable to process all voters by 19:00. The most serious single incident took place on the night of 13 September in Bugojno when a grenade exploded outside the house of a Croat member of the Local Electoral Commission. In protest Bosnian Croats withdrew members of polling committees from polling stations the next day for one hour, thus temporarily interrupting voting.
The massive security operation, the late and contradictory information on freedom of movement, and the segregation of voters crossing from one entity to the other minimised both the problems on the day and the turn-out of displaced persons. Once displaced persons realised that they would not be able to see their homes, many decided that it was not worth voting.
When the extent of the problem became known, OSCE issued instructions to the Local Election Commissions (LEC) and Polling Station Committees to direct voters whose names did not appear on voter lists to verify with the LEC, obtain a certificate, and return to polling stations to cast their ballots. However, this happened late in the day, when many voters had already returned home and given up on voting, and this instruction was not received uniformly in all localities. Furthermore, displaced persons who had crossed the IEBL to cast their ballots could not venture away from the secured polling stations where they arrived in buses and appeal to the LECs. In the event, thousands of voters could not vote. In two municipalities in Sarajevo, hundreds of disgruntled voters besieged the LEC offices, demanding that their right to vote be respected. In response, some municipalities extended the voting hours until 22:00 to accommodate voters who had experienced registration problems. OSCE could have foreseen this problem and prepared a contingency plan to address the issue. During the Mostar elections on 30 June this year, an estimated 2.8% of voters could not find their names on the voter lists. 93 The same problem was bound to repeat itself in the country-wide elections. The PEC Rules and Regulations (Article 213) require that a record be made of all significant events which occur at the polling station during election day. Following this requirement, some but not all polling station committees made a list of all voters who were turned back as a result of registration problems, so it is not possible to estimate the number of voters who were disenfranchised. Nonetheless, some observers reported that about 5% of voters were not able to cast their ballots in polling stations they visited, others reported that the rate was between 10 and 15%. In Mostar for example, the OSCE Director Regional Centre Gen. Wolfgang Odendahl reported that between 12 and 15% of voters could not find their names on the voter lists. 94 However if the lower 5% figure is used, then some 120,000 to 145,000 voters out of a total of "between 2.4 and 2.9 million" registered voters 95 may have been disenfranchised.
Following the vote, the Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC) received a number of complaints regarding the voter registration problems. The EASC Decision on these complaints stated it was "difficult to estimate the number of voters affected by the difficulties with the voters list", however without more it rejected "exaggerated allegations which have appeared in media and other reports," and dismissed the complaints concluding that it was satisfied "the numbers affected [were] not sufficient to call into question the integrity of the elections." 96
Other irregularities were not addressed by the EASC as complaints were apparently not filed. For example, international observers reported that a US delegation entered a polling station in the Mostar area with their security guards brandishing M16 automatic rifles despite warnings from OSCE Elections Supervisors that the PEC Rules and Regulations prohibited such acts. More serious irregularities were reported in the Brcko area. One international observer team monitoring the Bosanski Samac region witnessed ballot box stuffing by polling committee members, unauthorised persons in the polling station, persons voting for family members not present, and polling committee members acting partially. The choice of premises for some polling stations for displaced persons was tactless at best, gross at worse: one station in Foca was located at a notorious execution site where bullet holes from the massacre of Bosniacs could still be seen. In Lazete, near Zvornik, the voting took place at the exact spot where Bosniacs had been rounded up and detained in 1992 before being shot. A polling station in Doljani was located in a Roman Catholic church which is also the residence of the Catholic priest; Bosniac voters refused to vote there. And in Koraj in Republika Srpska, the polling station for displaced Bosniacs was located next to a destroyed mosque. The polling station for Bosniacs who wanted to vote in Zvornik was situated 16 km from the town on the edge of the municipality. It consisted of two green army tents set up by US IFOR at the end of a muddy quarry. "[T]he hundreds of refugees wait[ed] in the mud to be allowed to vote." 100 In Republika Srpska voting procedures for Bosniacs were often significantly slower than those for Serbs as if to discourage Bosniac voters and thus prevent them from casting their ballot before the 19:00 closing time. In the divided municipality of Gorazde/Kopaci where there were two polling stations - one for Serbs and one for Bosniacs; a third station was on reserve to be used if needed but was not opened until 13:30. The Bosniac polling station, which was in a factory behind a wire fence, opened late, at 7:30 and had only processed 250 people by 14:00. At the same time, between 7:00 and 16:00, the neighbouring Serb polling station processed local residents and over 30 busloads of Serb refugees coming from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition to these major concerns, a lesser number of violations at polling stations were reported by the CIM in it's preliminary report. Those were as follows: campaigning at polling stations - Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH) 3% and Republika Srpska (RS) 2%; other problems with voting circumstances - FBH 9% and RS 6%; insufficient or wrong ballot materials - FBH 4% and RS 2%; voting outside booths - FBH 3% and RS 2%; ballot boxes not sealed properly - FBH 5% and RS 3%; other problems with procedures - FBH 12% and RS 10%; voters not well informed - FBH 12% and RS 10%; other problems with comprehension - FBH 5% and RS 5%; other than impartiality and competency problems with polling station committees - FBH 9% and RS 8%; unauthorised persons present in polling stations - FBH 4% and RS 6%; local police present inside polling stations - FBH 12% and RS 8%; difficulties with physical access to polling stations - FBH 10% and RS 11%; and other accessibility problems with polling stations - FBH 6% and RS 5%. 101 The most serious concern voiced by the Coordinator of International Monitoring (CIM) was the freedom of movement, and access by displaced persons returning to vote where they lived before the war. CIM concluded that on election day the climate had not been established for such voters to cross the IEBL to cast ballots without fear of intimidation or personal safety, and that "the small number of voters that crossed the IEBL is an indicator that the Dayton principle of freedom of movement has not been met, and thus points to a disintegrative trend." 102 Had all displaced persons in the Federation who had not registered for absentee ballots attempted to travel to the municipalities in Republika Srpska in which they had been living in 1991 to vote, more than 150,000 would have crossed the inter-entity boundary line. 103 Moreover, the number of people crossing the IEBL could have included a further 7,000 persons from Republika Srpska making their way to the Federation, principally to the former Serb-majority towns of Drvar, Glamoc and Grahovo. However, on the day only 14,700 crossed - 13,500 from the Federation into Republika Srpska and 1,200 from Republika Srpska into the Federation. 104 This was a long way below the pre-election forecasts, less than the 25,000 initially reported and only marginally more than crossed without incident from one side of Mostar to the other during that divided city's municipal elections in June. As the head of CIM Ed van Thijn said during his first preliminary assessment of the voting day peace reigned on election day, but "peace and silence went together because of the low number of [people] crossing the IEBL." 105 Given the potential number of displaced persons crossing the IEBL, the key international organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina - IFOR, OSCE, IPTF and OHR - in collaboration with the interior ministries of both Republika Srpska and the Federation mounted a massive security operation to prevent any possibility of violence on the day. In practice, this meant special voter IEBL crossing points, mandated group crossings in buses, and segregated polling stations located just inside Republika Srpska. In total, 19 crossing points were designated "voter routes" and only vehicles equipped to carry eight or more passengers were permitted to cross the IEBL. The agreement by Ministers for Internal Affairs specifically noted: "To minimise traffic congestion and route congestion which could delay or restrict peoples' ability to reach their destination, smaller vehicles will not be permitted to utilise the voter routes." 106 Furthermore, the information on these security arrangement was contradictory: later on, the IEBL were declared totally open, even to cyclists, although this was, again, not enforced in practice. Delivered at the eleventh hour, changing until the last moment, it certainly was a deterrent for many voters. Besides, the chicanery and unexplained delays of buses in the morning of 14 September further discouraged prospective voters. It must be said however that a great part of the blame goes to the authorities on the Bosniac part of the Federation who failed to properly organise the bus network and disappointed many displaced people. Since pedestrians, people on bicycles and in private cars were going to be turned back at the IEBL, buses had to be at key points to ensure a respectable turn-out. However, the SDA only made a final decision to contest the elections in the week before polling day and failed to motivate prospective voters or to organise transport where it was required. As a result, at the IEBL crossing point by Doboj, for example, there were no buses in the morning so that the first displaced persons did not arrive at the polling station until after 13:00. The exceptionally low turn-out among voters who were scheduled to cross the IEBL on the day may be attributed to a variety of reasons. Of these, the location of polling stations is probably the most significant. Many Bosniacs had chosen to vote in the municipality in which they had been living in 1991 rather than by absentee ballot in the hope of returning, albeit briefly, to see their houses. However, since the designated polling stations for voters crossing the IEBL were often only a few hundred meters inside Republika Srpska and invariably well away from the towns and homes of displaced voters, the incentive to make the journey was minimised. Some voters who nevertheless crossed the IEBL in the hope of seeing their houses chose not to cast their ballots rather than vote at a designated polling station far from their homes. When, for example, a bus with 12 Bosniac passengers intending to vote at Gornji Seher was stopped by Bosnian Serb police in Krupa-na-Vrbasu and the OSCE officer advised the voters to cast their ballots where they were, the 12 refused and returned to Travnik without voting. The same happened with 52 Bosniac voters headed for Vlasenica. Another significant factor contributing to the low turn-out was the postponement of the municipal elections. Once this decision was announced much of the incentive to cross the IEBL disappeared. Displaced persons were no longer able to vote for the kind of municipality administration to which they would feel comfortable returning. The absence of a candidate from the displaced persons' ethnic group on the ballots for the tri-person Bosnian Presidency was a deterrent to cross the IEBL to vote in the general elections. The string of well-publicised incidents involving displaced persons who crossed the IEBL in recent months and memories of the bitter personal experiences of many members of ethnic groups venturing inside the territory of the other group clearly put off other less-determined, potential voters. Many of the buses assembling in Sarajevo to take voters to Republika Srpska were empty. One bus which was to go to Rudo, for example, never set off because only six voters turned up. There were similar shortcomings on the other side of the IEBL. More than 600 displaced Bosnian Serbs from Drvar in the Federation currently living in Banja Luka attempted to return home on election day. However, only 200 made it in four buses which they chartered themselves. The Republika Srpska authorities refused to lay on transport for the remaining 400.
Voting started in Ankara and Bajrampasa, a municipality of Istanbul, in Turkey as well as in Hungary on 25 August without the knowledge of the Bosnian parties. Indeed, the SDA, the ruling Bosniac party, only heard that the elections were under way when it received phone calls from voters asking whether they should participate. Moreover, refugees from Mostar claimed that they had received ballots for the municipal elections there even though these had taken place in June and were not being repeated. 108 As a consequence, party representatives were unable to attend the voting on 25 August in either Turkey or Hungary.
The Provisional Election Commission extended polling abroad on 5 September after refugees throughout the world complained about mix-ups in their ballots and late mail. In Australia, for example, ballots had not arrived on time 109 and in Germany and Austria large numbers of refugees from the Federation had received ballots for Republika Srpska and vice versa. 110 Elsewhere, in Croatia where more than 117,000 refugees had the right to vote, a high proportion of voters in Republika Srpska spoiled their ballots because they were in Cyrillic and there appeared to be no natural Croat candidates. 111 And in Dubrovnik refugee voting was rescheduled for 14 September because of a shortage of the correct ballots. 112
An estimated 37,000 Bosnian Serb refugees currently living in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia came by bus to vote in Republika Srpska on the day. 113 Virtually all were originally from the Federation and many were visiting for the first time the towns in which they were voting and in which they supposedly intended to live. In a massive logistical operation, refugee voters from Yugoslavia had to set off in the middle of the night in order to arrive in time to cast their ballots. The operation was facilitated by refugee associations in Yugoslavia which effectively organised a day out for their members laying on buses and supplying food for voters. Concentrations of refugees in Yugoslavia were clearly twined with towns in Republika Srpska to ensure that the operation ran smoothly. In this way, refugees living in Novi Sad, for example, were directed to Brcko, and those living in Uzice were directed to Visegrad. Meanwhile refugees from Kikinda and Zrenjanin, of whom there were 24 and 37 bus-loads respectively, were directed to Derventa. At least 25 buses arrived from Sremska Mitrovice to Zvornik, and 34 from Subotica to Modrica. To ensure a massive turn-out, refugees were told that they had to produce confirmation of potvrda (voting slips) to maintain their status and their entitlement to benefits and also to get on the bus taking them back to FRY. These were being handed out by appointed foremen outside the polling stations. 114 Many refugees complained that they had not been given the option to vote by absentee ballot where they had been living in 1991. VOTE COUNT AND RESULTS Preliminary Results As expected, preliminary results suggest that nationalist parties swept the board. 115 In the key battle for the triumvirate Presidency of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which according to the Constitution has to consist of one Bosniac, one Croat and one Serb, both Bosniac Alija Izetbegovic (SDA) and Croat Kresimir Zubak (HDZ) had a landslide with more than 80 per cent of the vote for their respective slots. Victory for Momcilo Krajisnik (SDS) in Republika Srpska was not as overwhelming. He polled 67 per cent of the vote for Serb member of the Presidency compared with close to 30 per cent for his nearest rival Mladen Ivanic jointly representing the two opposition blocs in Republika Srpska. However, Ivanic's relatively strong performance may be largely attributed to the absentee votes of Bosniac and Croat refugees and displaced persons. In total, Izetbegovic polled 724,733 votes, Krajisnik 698,891, and Zubak 297,976, making Izetbegovic the probable President of the Bosnian Presidency until the next elections in two years' time. A further 9 per cent of the ballots were spoiled in Republika Srpska, and 4 per cent in the Federation.In the contest for President of Republika Srpska Biljana Plavsic (SDS) polled 65 per cent of the vote. Her nearest rival was Zivko Radisic of the Savez za mir i progres (SMP) who polled 16.5 per cent. Adib Dozic, a Bosniac candidate of the SDA, came third with just over 10 per cent of the vote. 116 In the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the assembly which contains members from both Republika Srpska and the Federation, the SDA will be the largest party with 19 out of 42 seats. Of these SDA seats, 16 come from voters in the Federation and three from voters in the Republika Srpska. The SDS is the next largest block with eight seats and the HDZ has seven seats. The seven remaining seats are shared between non-nationalist parties, two from the Federation, the Zdruzena Lista (three seats) and Stranka za BiH (two seats), and the Savez za mir i progres from the Republika Srpska (two seats). In the House of Representatives of the Federation the SDA has an absolute majority. It polled 55 per cent of the vote which translates into 78 of 140 seats. With 23 per cent of the vote and 33 seats, the HDZ forms the second largest block. Non-nationalists polled about 15 per cent. The Stranka za BiH polled 7.5 per cent and won 11 seats. The Zdruzena Lista polled 7 per cent and won 10 seats. In the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, the SDS has an absolute majority. It polled 59 per cent of the vote. The Savez za mir i progres was second with 12 per cent. The Srpska patriotska stranka and the SDA both polled about 7 per cent. 117 In the contest for the ten cantons in the Federation, the SDA took six cantons and HDZ four. The combined votes of the two nationalist parties ranged from a low of 65 per cent in canton 9 (Sarajevo) to highs of 93 per cent in cantons 6 and 7 (Central Bosnia and Neretva). The closest battle between the nationalists was in canton 6 (Central Bosnia) where the SDA polled 49.7 per cent and the HDZ 43.5 per cent.
Vote Count Discrepancies
On the basis of the results from the election for the Serb, Bosniac and Croat members of the Bosnian Presidency, the voter turn-out appears improbably high. In total, 1,033,345 votes were cast for the four candidates standing for Serb member of the Bosnian Presidency and a further 102,432 ballots were spoiled. Another 905,188 votes were cast for the eight candidates standing for Bosniac member of the Bosnian Presidency. And 339,228 votes were cast for the four candidates standing for Croat member of the Bosnian Presidency. In addition, 51,364 ballots cast for the Bosnian presidency in the Federation were spoiled. To obtain these results 2,431,554 voters must have cast ballots. 118 According to UN, OSCE, IFOR and OHR estimates of the electorate in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the maximum theoretical electorate was 2,920,000. 119 This consists of 1,345,000 Bosnian voters who are currently living in their homes, 675,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) with the right to vote living within Bosnia-Herzegovina and 900,000 voters, now refugees living abroad. However, of the potential 900,000 refugee voters only 641,000 registered to vote, reducing the maximum electorate to 2,661,000. For 2,431,544 voters to have cast ballots in the election for the Bosnian Presidency, the turn-out had to have been 91.4 per cent of the electorate. To put the figures into context, turn-out in the 1990 elections for the Bosnian Presidency was 74.42 per cent of the then electorate and only 2,339,958 Bosnians voted. 120 The following points should also be taken into consideration:
The one problem with the above figures concerns the numbers of registered refugee voters. According to the OSCE's Report on Refugee Voter Registration a total of 641,010 refugee voters registered to vote. This included 220,640 from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of whom 123,000 had registered for form P-2, i.e. to vote in person on the day. In the OSCE's Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Facts and Figures it indicates that a total of 138,000 refugees registered for form P-2, and that 503,000 registered to vote by absentee ballot. However, according to the master sheet of absentee ballot registration sorted by opstina (annex BII of the Report on Refugee Voter Registration), only 423,284 refugees had registered to vote by absentee ballot. It therefore appears that approximately 80,000 refugees have been double counted. In the above analysis, the figures have only been counted once among the refugee voters who failed to vote. The results of the vote count indicate that a serious discrepancy exists. While ICG does not have evidence to suggest fraud, nonetheless the discrepancy casts serious doubt on the validity of the elections. As a consequence, on 21 September ICG filed a complaint with the Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC), urging a recount of the votes cast, and a postponement of any publication or certification of the results until a recount. The ICG complaint further urged that, if the discrepancy is confirmed, then the election results should be declared null and void, and the voting repeated. Four hours after ICG filed the complaint, at a press conference on 21 September, OSCE announced that they were experiencing computer programme errors as well as other problems with the vote count, and that they would address the difficulties shortly. OSCE also announced that the total voter population estimates should have been between 3.2 and 3.5 million, and that they had erred when they used the 2.9 million figure earlier. However, OSCE failed to produce any documentation or rationale to support their new numbers for total voter population.
CERTIFICATION OF THE ELECTIONS
The criteria as expressed in the OSCE Copenhagen Commitments 131 � and the Dayton Peace Agreement remain the only relevant yardstick. Yet the election must also be considered in a conflict solving capacity. Whether the election leads to integration or disintegration will only become clear as immediate events unfold. Within the context of the election in Bosnia and Herzegovina, several of the OSCE Copenhagen commitments were only partially met. In particular � the right to establish in full freedom political parties�, � political campaigning to be conducted in a fair and free atmosphere, and � unimpeded access to the media, were not fully met. The Dayton Peace agreement outlines the following five basic conditions which were only fulfilled to varying degrees: a politically neutral environment; the right to vote in secrete without fear or intimidation; freedom of expression and the press; freedom of association�; and freedom of movement." 132 The Co-ordinator for International Monitoring, Ed van Thijn concluded that the elections went well technically, however, "the general climate in which the elections took place was in some cases below the minimum standards of the OSCE Copenhagen Document." Although the elections were characterised by "imperfections", CIM continued, they "provide a first and cautious step for the democratic functioning of the governing structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina." CIM also cautioned that "the international community, having started its support for this process, should face up to the longer term responsibility of helping to see it through." Finally CIM stated, it "anticipates that this statement will be fully considered before the municipal elections take place. Until the problems affecting the integrity of the elections have been addressed and solved, these elections should not be held." 133 While CIM concludes that the Copenhagen Document criteria contained in paragraphs 7 and 8 (attached to DPA Annex 3 - see section II(B(2) above) were only "partially met" and that the five conditions formulated in DPA were "fulfilled to varying degrees", he found it difficult to assess the freedom and fairness of the elections because the country was emerging from four years of war. In essence then, CIM was unable to find the September 14 elections "free and fair." When on 25 June the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Flavio Cotti certified that elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina could go ahead, he admitted that minimum conditions for holding free, fair and democratic poll did not exist. Those conditions deteriorated further in the intervening months between Cotti's certification and 14 September polling day. Indeed, the past, present and future Chairmen-in-Office of the OSCE (the Troika Ministers) declared on 19 September that "they are concerned that the conditions for 'free, fair and democratic' elections ... have not been satisfied." 134 Although the day of the elections passed off with minimal violence, the event cannot be considered a triumph of democracy. Once the date for the poll had been fixed under considerable outside pressure, the OSCE had an enormous task to accomplish in a very short time. It had neither the experience nor the means to conduct highly complicated elections. Serious problems encountered by the organisation during the voter registration process and onerous security measures on polling day disenfranchised tens of thousands of voters. There was no effective protection against refugees in neighbouring countries to vote twice by first casting absentee ballots and then voting in person after travelling to the country. Yet more alarming, preliminary results published by the OSCE showed a voter turn-out of more than 100%. OSCE officials were forced to admit one week after the elections, and after ICG sounded an alarm, that they had discovered numerous errors in their vote count procedures. However, figures published subsequently by OSCE confirmed the same discrepancy. Thus, the validity of these elections is in serious doubt, the results cannot be certified, and the elections must be rerun at a later date. These elections should not be declared free, fair, or democratic either. If they are, the international community will have seriously undermined its own credibility. While the international community has an overwhelming desire to use whatever result as a basis for pressing ahead with building new institutions while IFOR is still present, there is no guarantee that this is possible. The history of trying to build the Federation without effectively dealing with the extreme nationalists who have obstructed its development indicates the kind of problems the international community will face. If these elections are not declared free, fair and democratic, sanctions on Republika Srpska and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia suspended by the UN Security Council will not have to be automatically lifted until a next round of nation-wide elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina satisfies the conditions for a free, fair and democratic poll. Furthermore, it is wholly irresponsible to hold the municipal elections in November. ICG fully agrees with the statement by OSCE Troika Ministers who "deem it indispensable that before these municipal elections are held, the problems which led to postponing the elections be solved." 135 Experience shows that fixing polling day before minimum conditions exist merely acts as a disincentive to the Parties to live up to their DPA obligations. The Troika Ministers recalled that indicted war criminals have not been delivered to the Tribunal. ICG believes they must not simply be marginalised or shielded from public view; they must be sent to The Hague. The international community must proceed to arrest at least those criminals whose whereabouts are known. IFOR's continued refusal to do that, and the international community's approach to the whole question of capturing the indictees, has been recently termed "pusillanimous" by Judge Richard Goldstone, the outgoing Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 136 The arrest of indicted war criminals will send a signal to the local municipal authorities who obstruct the return of displaced persons and refugees that their violations of DPA will not be tolerated. OSCE must deal more forcefully with recalcitrant local officials, political parties and media by more effectively using its own rules and regulations. The proposal of Federation Mediator and ICG board member Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling earlier this year to remove municipal authorities if they obstruct the implementation of the DPA should be adopted as a strategy of the OSCE for the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. In this sense the statement of the OSCE Head of Mission, Ambassador Frowick of 19 August 1996 in which he threatened to "invalidate electoral results, including the election of individual candidates, in those towns and municipalities where there is systematic interference with democratic freedoms" is encouraging. The OSCE should issue a statement along the same lines, identifying clearly which behaviour by the municipal authorities will not be tolerated and what will be the consequences of misbehaviour, spelling out the possible punishments. Perpetrators of violent attacks against displaced persons and refugees making assessment visits to their former homes have to be punished to the full extent of the law. A sustained policy of punishing all wrongdoers will brake the cycle of impunity, will help re-establish some credibility to the Organisation, and will be a step towards creating the conditions for free, fair and democratic elections. If obstruction to freedom of movement punished systematically, there will be less of a problem for the international community to enforce it on the day of the municipal elections. Once obstructions to the repatriation and reintegration are removed, the DPA provision that Bosnians will vote "as a general rule" where they lived in 1991 can be implemented, otherwise the municipal elections will serve to ratify the ethnic cleansing. Indeed without genuine freedom of movement, repatriation and reintegration, the municipal elections will only lead to the appointment of "governments in exile," whose installation will be impossible with or without IFOR. The role of OSCE's supervising organs must be drastically strengthened. The Organisation's human rights department must be given more freedom to press publicly for the improvement of conditions, and the Organisation as a whole must be more committed to its own standards and benchmarks. The Election Appeals Sub-Commission and the Media Experts Commission must be given the adequate human and financial resources to strengthen their credibility and the deterrent effect of their decisions. Finally, without an immediate announcement by the Contact Group that IFOR and IPTF will remain in Bosnia for another two years, the goals of DPA will remain unattainable. Sarajevo, 22 September 1996
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