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<h1>Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia</h1>
<p class="small">April 30, 1997 (Part 1 of 2)</p>
<p>
<br>
<h2>Contents</h2>
<ul class="normal">
<b><li><a href="#exec">EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</a></b>
</ul>
<p><ol type="1">
<b><li><a href="#1">Introduction</a></b>
<p>
<b><li><a href="#2">DPA Promise To Displaced Persons: Wishful Thinking? </a></b>
<p>
<b><li><a href="#3">1996 Returns Short Of Expectations</a></b>
<p>
<b><li><a href="#4">A Year Of Obstruction To Minority Returns</a></b>
<p>
<ul class="normal">
<li><a href="#4a">Objectives And Benchmarks</a>
<p>
<li><a href="#4b">Measures Initiated</a>
<p>
<ol type="1" class="small">
<li><a href="#4b1">Target Areas For Returns</a>
<li><a href="#4b2">Shelter Programmes</a>
<li><a href="#4b3">Coalition For Return - A Promising Development</a>
<li><a href="#4b4">ZOS Return Procedures</a>
<li><a href="#4b5">Pilot Projects Within The Federation</a>
<li><a href="#4b6">Organised Assessment Visits</a>
<li><a href="#4b7">Bus Services</a>
<li><a href="#4b8">Municipalities Blacklisted By OHR</a>
<li><a href="#4b9">Repatriation Information Reports</a>
</ol>
<p>
<li><a href="#4c">Regional Perspective</a>
<p>
</ul>
<b><li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#5">Obstacles To Return</a></b>
<p>
<ul class="normal">
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#5a">Conditions That Affect All Returnees</a>
<p>
<ol type="1" class="small">
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#5a1">Abandoned Property Laws</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#5a2">Depressed Economy And High Unemployment</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#5a3">Mines And Unexploded Ordnance</a>
</ol>
<p>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#5b">Conditions Of Particular Concern To Minorities</a>
<p>
<ol type="1" class="small">
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#5b1">Forcible Expulsions, Obstruction Of Returns, And Violence Against Minorities</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#5b2">"Ethnic Engineering"</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#5b3">Obstruction Of Freedom Of Movement</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#5b4">Media Propaganda Against Reintegration</a>
</ol>
</ul>
<p>
<b><li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#6">Repatriation Of Refugees From Western Europe</a></b>
<p>
<b><li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7">Looking Forward - Measures To Increase Returns In 1997</a></b>
<p>
<ul class="normal">
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7a">Support For Returns: Housing, Property Rights, Jobs</a>
<p>
<ol type="1" class="small">
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7a1">Urgent Need For Funding For Housing Reconstruction</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7a2">Code Of Practice For Reconstruction Programmes</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7a3">War-Time Property Laws</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7a4">Support For The Property commission</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7a5">RS Entity Law On Citizenship And Policy Against Minority Returns</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7a6">Access To Housing And Basic Services</a></ol>
<p>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7b">Support For The Reintegration Of Minorities</a>
<p>
<ol type="1" class="small">
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7b1">Condition Economic Assistance On Compliance With The DPA</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7b2">Reinforce Grass-Roots Level Displaced Persons Organisations</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7b3">Confidence-Building Measures</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7b4">Promote Substantial Minority Returns To Key Areas</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7b5">Promote Minority Returns To Target Areas And Priority Target Areas</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7b6">Ensure Security For Minorities</a></ol>
<p>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7c">Freedom Of Movement And Communications</a>
<p>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7d">Breaking The Grip Of The Nationalist Parties</a>
<p>
<ol type="1" class="small">
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7d1">Arrest And Put On Trial Indicted War Criminals</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7d2">Create Mechanism To Remove Obstructionist Officials At All Levels</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7d3">Strengthen Moderate Non-Nationalist Alternatives</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7b4">Create Conditions For Free, Fair And Democratic Municipal Elections</a>
<li><a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/bh22rep2.html#7d5">Boost Alternative Media And Pursue Aggressive Anti-Nationalist Public Information Campaign</a>
</ol>
</ul>
</ol>
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="exec"><h2>Executive Summary</h2></a>
<p>
<b>Apart from stopping the fighting, silencing the guns and separating forces, the single clearest promise of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was that Bosnian refugees and internally displaced persons would be able to return home. </b> However, the number of returnees has to date fallen far short of expectations. More than sixteen months after the DPA came into force, only about 250,000 refugees and internally displaced persons have actually made it home, almost exclusively to areas in which they form part of the majority group. And even that figure portrays an artificially rosy picture, since a further 80,000 people have been displaced in the same period, largely during the transfer of territory between the two Entities.
<p>
About 400,000 out of some 1.2 million Bosnian refugees at the beginning of 1996 have already found durable solutions, whether by repatriating, being granted a more permanent status in host countries, starting the process of acquiring citizenship, or actually obtaining citizenship. That leaves a little over 815,000 still seeking solutions, of whom the greatest number are located in Germany (315,000), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (253,000) and Croatia (160,000). In addition, some 750,000 remain displaced within Bosnia and Herzegovina, of whom roughly 450,000 are in the Federation and 300,000 in Republika Srpska (RS Entity). And a further 48,000 Croatian Serbs have settled in the RS Entity.
<p>
Displaced persons face a host of obstacles to return. Some conditions -- such as the severely depleted housing stock, war-time property laws and a devastated economy -- plague all returnees. Others impose a particular burden on people seeking to return to areas where they would be in the minority. These include in particular the security and political situations -- exacerbated in most areas by the continuance in power of nationalist authorities and in some areas of indicted or suspected war criminals – as well as discrimination, inadequate and sometimes intentionally distorted information about conditions in the areas to which people hope to return, and inadequate or hostile schooling for their children.
<p>
That so few displaced Bosnians have succeeded in returning to their homes is not for want of trying. In the course of 1996 a whole host of schemes, some bold and imaginative, have been tried to get the process under way. These include targeting special areas; repairing housing; selecting pilot projects; organising assessment visits; blacklisting obstructionist municipalities; linking together associations of displaced persons of all ethnic backgrounds in a single country-wide lobby group (the Coalition for Return); running free bus services between key cities across the former front lines; and resettling the Zone of Separation (ZOS), the land along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line between the RS Entity and the Federation.
<p>
Of these initiatives, some have achieved notable successes. More than 283,000 passengers have taken advantage of the UN High commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) free bus service to cross former confrontation lines. And members of the Coalition for Return have begun to lobby the authorities where they are currently living on behalf of other displaced persons of different ethnic backgrounds in an effort to change the political climate for return. However, the fact that international agencies have had to focus so much effort on the ZOS, probably the most heavily mined and devastated tract of land least-suited to returns in the entire country, is indicative of the overall lack of progress.
<p>
In practice, minority returns have been consistently obstructed by the nationalist political parties in power. After all, the right of all refugees and internally displaced persons to return to areas in which they form a minority conflicts head-on with the explicit war aims of the Bosnian Serb leadership, which were secession and creation of an "ethnically pure" state, as well as with the more covert aims of the Bosnian Croat authorities. In order to prevent minority returns, the media have generated a climate of hostility to returnees, assessment visits have been blocked, and houses systematically destroyed.
<p>
Despite political obstructionism within Bosnia and Herzegovina, host countries are determined to repatriate Bosnian refugees. In late 1996, starting with Germany, Western European states began proceedings to deport Bosnian refugees, regardless of their place of origin. As a result, UNHCR expects up to 200,000 refugees to return to Bosnia and Herzegovina, half from Germany, during 1997. Some 160,000 (mostly Bosniacs) are expected to return to the Federation, and another 40,000 to the RS Entity. Repatriating refugees are expected to dislodge at least 50,000 internally displaced persons who are currently occupying the refugees' homes. This is in addition to the 20,000 who are still living in collective centres.
<p>
The international community's main source of leverage to accomplish repatriation targets is economic conditionality. Reconstruction funds should therefore be carefully tailored to promote minority returns as well as to enable majority returns on a significant scale. To this end, all housing and infrastructure reconstruction programmes must be linked to minority returns. Moreover, in order to ensure the smooth reintegration of returnees into Bosnian society and minimise resentment, assistance should also be channelled to the receiving communities. The benefits of accepting minority displaced persons back into the community must be tangible and well advertised. But for this to work, all donors must be committed to the policy. It is counter-productive if intransigent local authorities are able to take advantage of "competitive" donors.
<p>
Only 40,000 of up to half a million housing units damaged during the war have been repaired during the past year. Accommodating 200,000 returning refugees requires massive expansion of existing shelter projects. Some 50-60,000 additional dwellings must be repaired, whereas, at present, funding is available for only 18,000 units. The funding shortfall in this area is $320 million. In addition, without substantial progress in de-mining, reconstruction of housing will be hampered.
<p>
The commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees was established under Annex 7 of the DPA to determine the rights of persons to real property from which they have been displaced and is key to the successful return of minorities and majorities alike. The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, which already funds the Office of the High Representative, should also fund the commission through regular assessments. Meanwhile, donor governments should immediately commit the $3.1 million to meet the commission's minimum needs. Also, both Entities must repeal property laws which discriminate against displaced persons and inhibit their return.
<p>
The Brcko Supervisor has announced the plan through which he intends to expedite the voluntary return of non-Serb displaced persons to Brcko, and the voluntary return of Serbs now resident in Brcko to their former homes in the Federation. He has outlined a straightforward and equitable procedure for launching a systematic return process that hastens the return of displaced persons to their homes, both in Brcko and in the Federation. The plan stands a good chance of unravelling one of the most complex issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its implementation should be the highest priority for the international community in 1997.
<p>
Leaving responsibility for guaranteeing the security of returning minorities to local authorities, many of whom ethnically cleansed them from their respective regions in the first place, severely compromises the return process. If minorities are to return home with a modicum of security, SFOR has to interpret its mandate in a more robust manner. When, for example, minority-owned houses are destroyed, SFOR should remove an equal number of tanks from cantonment sites in the Entity in which the incident occurred and destroy them. A "tank for a house" response would be measured, proportionate, easy to explain and transparently fair. Furthermore, the RS Entity must agree to vet its police force according to the IPTF guidelines.
<p>
Even if the above measures are implemented, it is naive to expect a large number of returns unless there is a fundamental shift in the political climate from one of separation to one of reconciliation. Any strategy to help minorities back to their homes must therefore also be one which seeks to break the vice-like grip of the nationalist parties on Bosnian society. To this end, the issue of war crimes must be tackled head-on and those indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia must be arrested, surrendered to the Tribunal, and prosecuted. In addition, since the nationalist cancer extends beyond those individuals who have already been indicted and there are obstructionist officials at all levels, a DPA Implementation Council must be formed with the power to dismiss such people.
<p>
Municipal elections, which are scheduled for 13 and 14 September, can be an effective tool against the nationalist parties, but only if the international community is prepared to insist on minimum conditions to make them free and fair. Critically, the electoral engineering which took place with the registration process in 1996 must not be repeated. Since obstruction of minority returns clearly has an impact on the conditions for free, fair and democratic elections, disqualification of candidates can be a powerful tool with which to stimulate the return process.
<p>
<b><p align="RIGHT">Sarajevo, 30 April 1997</p></b>
<br>
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="1"><h2>Introduction</h2></a>
<p>
Apart from actually stopping the fighting, silencing guns and separating forces, the single clearest promise of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was that Bosnian refugees and internally displaced persons would be able to return home. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#1" target="notes"><sup><b>1</sup></b></a>
<p>
Although the path to some political objectives of the treaty was tortuous and almost abstract, and could only be achieved through intermediate stages, the "right to return" was stated in an unambiguous language:
<p>
<blockquote>All refugees and [internally] displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#2" target="notes"><sup><b>2</sup></b></a></blockquote>
<p>
Sixteen months after the signing of the DPA, most refugees and internally displaced persons have not, in fact, returned. And given the constraints that have become obvious in the meantime, it now appears that many will not do so, at least not soon.
<p>
This report is an attempt to take stock, realistically, of the progress that has been made in returning refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes; the efforts that have been made to that end in the past 16 months by citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the international community; the obstacles that are still hindering return; and the implications of the deeply disappointing result to date.
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="2"><h2>DPA Promise to Displaced Persons: Wishful Thinking?</h2></a>
<p>
To understand the difficulty of achieving the goals promised in the DPA, it is necessary to keep in mind both the mechanisms established to enforce the agreement and the intentions and motives of all the signatories. They include the parties that fought the war (Parties); and the states that assumed responsibilities for implementing the treaty.
<p>
The war that broke out in former Yugoslavia in 1991 was particularly vicious because one of the fundamental war aims was to drive large numbers of civilians from their homes. The goal of nationalist leaders was the creation of homogeneous, ethnically "pure" states in a region where ethnic and religious groups have long been intermingled in every way: as citizens, as neighbours and in millions of cases as family members. As a consequence, this was a war less directed against military targets than against civilians. Under the nationalist strategy of "ethnic cleansing", much of the civilian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina became the target of military operations and terror to drive them from their homes. Because those campaigns were not halted at the outset by other states that could have stopped them, over time they proved grotesquely successful.
<p>
The DPA which stopped the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina in November 1995 contains certain fundamental weaknesses. Foremost, the enforcement mechanisms for the civilian provisions of the treaty are inadequate. Rather, the treaty relies primarily on the Parties for enforcement, although it was perfectly clear from the start that the will to comply was not present on all sides.
<p>
There is an inherent contradiction between the treaty's aim to re-establish Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state within its pre-war internationally recognised borders, and its acceptance of the existence of two sub-state Entities with many of the attributes of a state -- the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation) and the Entity of Republika Srpska (RS Entity). Moreover, the Federation was de facto subdivided between two bitterly hostile ethnic groups. During an internecine war in 1993-1994, Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats had used the same tactics of "ethnic cleansing" against each other, generating an additional population of displaced persons. As a result, the unity of both the Federation and of Bosnia and Herzegovina itself remains deeply troubled and endangered.
<p>
Most of the Bosnian Serb and Croat leaders, and a small number of extremist Bosniac leaders, are committed to nationalist parties that are still pursuing parallel policies of ethnic exclusivity and dominance. A few of these leaders are indicted war criminals and many others have profited from the war and still benefit from mafia-style relationships with the governments of their areas. They have no reason to favour the rule of law or the erosion of nationalist fanaticism, or to facilitate the return of "minorities" to the areas they control.
<p>
Through control of the media, nationalist politicians have maintained and even extended their hold on power since the war. Bitter, suffering populations on all sides are acutely susceptible to divisive nationalist propaganda, and the signs of readiness for reconciliation, which is a precondition for reintegration, are few and far between. As High Representative Carl Bildt recently noted in his fifth report to the Secretary General of the United Nations, "any attempt at major minority return is meeting fierce resistance ranging from the violent to the bureaucratic." <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#3" target="notes"><sup><b>3</sup></b></a>
<p>
Thus, the repatriation and return of refugees and internally displaced persons has been vexed by the existence of the two formal (plus one de facto) Entities whose authorities were left in control of the territory they held at the time of the DPA signing (with some adjustments), and who have pursued diametrically opposed policies. After all, the right of all refugees and internally displaced persons to return and live in a single state of Bosnia and Herzegovina conflicts head-on with the explicit war aims of the RS Entity, which were secession and creation of an "ethnically pure" state, and with the more covert aims of the Bosnian Croat authorities. This important fact-on-the-ground cannot be over-emphasised. It lies just under the surface of the DPA, ready to subvert its intent.
<p>
The cease-fire line between the Federation and the RS Entity, which in the DPA was somewhat changed and renamed the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), contains its own inherent instability. One of the implications has been that the return of displaced persons to the Zone of Separation (ZOS) <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#4" target="notes"><sup><b>4</sup></b></a> that flanks the IEBL has been loaded with military significance for both sides even while it is a demilitarised zone.
<p>
The commitments and objectives of the states that have joined in the creation of the NATO-led multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) and the subsequent Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been in certain ways contradictory from the start. Almost before arriving, military authorities were stressing their "exit strategies", which gave the nationalist authorities the signal to "wait it out". The initial one-year mandate was not extended until late in the fall of 1996, and then only for an additional 18 months.
<p>
The multinational forces achieved their military objectives with ease, separating the combatants, establishing control of the ZOS, opening roads, and monitoring the cantonment of heavy weapons. Thereafter, however, they assumed a minimalist stance on some of the vital "additional" tasks in support of the civilian implementation of the treaty. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#5" target="notes"><sup><b>5</sup></b></a> The near-phobia about "mission creep" and the aversion to risk casualties has prevented the huge international presence from addressing Bosnia and Herzegovina's transparent need for an extended period of stabilisation, which is all the more pressing given the unresolved tensions in the civilian side of the peace settlement.
<p>
A less often confronted element in the displaced persons return conundrum is the evident divergence of interests among the international community which have contributed troops to the multinational force and assumed other responsibilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the one hand, a compelling interest of some European countries is repatriating the hundreds of thousands of refugees who were granted "temporary protection". On the other hand, the primary interest of the United States, which brokered the peace treaty and has been the crucial backbone of the NATO-led forces, seems to be limiting its long-term involvement.
<p>
Finally, the regional issue has been part of the refugee dilemma from the start. Croats, Serbs and Bosnians have been driven across front-lines and borders in criss-cross patterns and are now occupying what remains of the housing in each others' places of origin. Unless there can be a regional repatriation, which is difficult to visualise given the political stance of the government in Croatia in particular, the return process in Bosnia and Herzegovina is partially blocked.
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="3"><h2>1996 Returns Short of Expectations</h2></a>
<p>
According to the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the Peace Implementation Council of the DPA, approximately one-half of Bosnia and Herzegovina's pre-war population of 4.3 million were displaced during the 43 months of war. Some one million of the displaced remained within the country, and over 1.2 million refugees were dispersed throughout 25 host states. At the start of 1996, out of a remaining population of approximately three million in Bosnia, 80 percent or 2.4 million were affected by the war, including the one million internally displaced, and were dependent on some level of international humanitarian assistance. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#6" target="notes"><sup><b>6</sup></b></a> Figures for refugees and internally displaced persons provided in this section are approximate and, at times, vary depending on the source. As such, slight discrepancies may be found if these figures are totalled.
<p>
By early 1996, Germany was host to the largest number of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina (345,000), followed by Croatia (288,000), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (253,000), Austria (80,000), Sweden (61,500), Switzerland (26,700), Slovenia (33,400), the Netherlands (23,500), Denmark (23,000), United Kingdom (13,000), and Norway (12,000). <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#7" target="notes"><sup><b>7</sup></b></a> Bosniacs constituted the largest number of the refugees (610,000), followed by Bosnian Croats (307,000), Bosnian Serbs (253,000), and others (23,000). Some 620,000 refugees originated from territories now in the RS Entity, and 598,000 from the Federation. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#8" target="notes"><sup><b>8</sup></b></a>
<p>
Contingent on security, funding, reconstruction and de-mining, the Humanitarian Issues Working Group assumed at the beginning of 1996 that up to 500,000 internally displaced persons would return to their homes and 370,000 refugees (170,000 from the immediate region and 200,000 from other countries) would repatriate during the year.
<p>
For the internally displaced, the priority was to find durable solutions for those accommodated in collective centres, including the temporary use of rehabilitated vacant housing, accommodation with relatives and friends, and initiatives for their local integration in the Entity within which they were located. For refugees, plans called for their repatriation, first, to home areas where they constituted the majority ethnic group, provided that adequate accommodation was available; and second, to areas of origin where they would be in the minority ethnic group. For both groups, returns and repatriation to areas of origin where they would be in the minority ethnic group were considered to be "complex and daunting tasks". <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#9" target="notes"><sup><b>9</sup></b></a>
<p>
The actual return and repatriation figures for 1996 fell far short of expectations and an additional 80,000 people were displaced as a result of the transfer of territories, mainly the Sarajevo suburbs, between the two Entities. Only some 250,000 refugees and internally displaced persons returned to their homes or home areas in 1996, and returns occurred almost exclusively to areas where the returnees were part of the majority group. The low number of returns had been "mainly due to failure by the Parties [in Bosnia and Herzegovina] to implement fully the provisions of Annex 7 and related annexes [of the DPA], particularly those relating to freedom of movement and freedom to return and/or repatriate to areas of origin. Limited housing and damaged essential infrastructure, combined with uncertainties about security and unemployment prospects, were also significant factors which affected return movements overall." <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#10" target="notes"><sup><b>10</sup></b></a> Confidence building measures initiated by the Office of the UN High commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to promote returns and repatriation, including organised assessment visits by the displaced to areas of origin, were "met with unacceptable resistance". <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#11" target="notes"><sup><b>11</sup></b></a> And the general climate in the country was characterised as "one of obstruction of minority returns". <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#12" target="notes"><sup><b>12</sup></b></a>
<p>
Of the approximately 250,000 displaced persons who returned to their homes during 1996, 88,000 were refugees, the remaining were internally displaced persons. The great majority of the refugees (80,000) returned to the Federation, and 8,000 to the RS Entity. In the Federation, 29,000 refugees repatriated to Sarajevo, 22,900 to Una Sana Canton, and the remaining to the Cantons of Posavina (8,400), Tuzla-Podrinje (5,700), Tomislavgrad (4,900), Zenica-Doboj (2,900), Central Bosnia (2,000), and Gorazde (700). The destination of some 2,800 repatriating refugees to the Federation and to the RS Entity were not known. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#13" target="notes"><sup><b>13</sup></b></a>
<p>
Of the 164,000 internally displaced persons who returned home during 1996, some 102,000 (mainly Bosniacs) returned to the Federation, of whom 94,000 returned to areas where they were in the majority group and 8,300 to areas where they were in the minority group. About 62,000 returned to the RS Entity, of whom 60,700 belonged to the majority group and only 1,100 to a minority group. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#14" target="notes"><sup><b>14</sup></b></a>
<p>
UNHCR estimates that, out of the more than 1.2 million Bosnian refugees at the beginning of 1996, 399,600 have already found a durable solution by repatriating, being granted a more permanent status in the host countries, starting the process of acquiring citizenship there, or actually obtaining citizenship. The remaining 815,700 refugees are still in need of durable solutions at the start of 1997. The greatest number of refugees still in need of permanent solution are located in Germany (315,000), FRY (253,000), Croatia (160,000), Switzerland (19,500), Austria (11,000), United Kingdom (4,600), Italy (8,400), Slovenia (8,400), France (7,400), the Netherlands (6,000), and Belgium (5,700). In addition, some 16,000 refugees in need of a permanent solution are disbursed in other European states. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#15" target="notes"><sup><b>15</sup></b></a>
<p>
UNHCR expects that up to 200,000 refugees may repatriate during 1997, the greatest number from Germany (100,000). Some 160,000 (the majority of them Bosniacs) are expected to repatriate to the Federation, and 40,000 to the RS Entity. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#16" target="notes"><sup><b>16</sup></b></a> Up to 80 percent of the repatriation is expected to be "spontaneous". <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#17" target="notes"><sup><b>17</sup></b></a> These repatriating refugees are expected to dislodge 50,000 internally displaced persons who are currently occupying the refugees' homes and for whom adequate accommodation must be found.
<p>
Precise data for the number of internally displaced persons at the end of the war as well as current figures are not available. Nonetheless, UNHCR and Federation authorities agree that there were an estimated 450,000 internally displaced persons in the Federation as of the beginning of 1997. In the RS Entity, officials estimate that the current number of internally displaced persons total 416,000. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#18" target="notes"><sup><b>18</sup></b></a> However the Coalition for Return estimates differ - 605,000 internally displaced persons in the Federation, and 295,000 in the RS Entity. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#19" target="notes"><sup><b>19</sup></b></a> Moreover, some 48,000 Croatian refugees of Serb origin from the Krajina have settled in the RS Entity. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#20" target="notes"><sup><b>20</sup></b></a> An increasing number of Croatian Serbs are moving from Eastern Slavonia to the RS Entity. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#21" target="notes"><sup><b>21</sup></b></a>
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4"><h2>A Year Of Obstruction To Minority Returns</h2></a>
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4a"><h3>Objectives and Benchmarks</h3></a>
<p>
At the start of 1996, the international community's primary objective for return and repatriation of displaced persons was to ensure that lasting solutions were found "through a process of early, peaceful, orderly and phased return to a place of their choice in Bosnia and Herzegovina" by promoting "the reintegration of individuals and families into stable communities where their fundamental human rights [were to] be protected and where their basic needs [were to be] met." <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#22" target="notes"><sup><b>22</sup></b></a>
<p>
Repatriation of refugees was to take place strictly on a voluntary basis and only after three benchmarks were met: (1) implementation of the military provisions of the DPA; (2) the adoption of amnesty laws according to the DPA; and (3) the adoption by the parties of confidence-building measures to prevent activities within their territories which would hinder or impede the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, including the functioning of human rights mechanisms. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#23" target="notes"><sup><b>23</sup></b></a>
<p>
The success of the international community's return and repatriation efforts depended on several factors: commitment of the Parties and the international community to the full implementation of the DPA, including provisions relating to freedom of movement; speedy and co-ordinated response by the international community to the needs of returning displaced persons; funding for reconstruction; the provision of timely and detailed information to returning displaced persons on the situation prevailing in their former homes or desired area of return; mine awareness campaign and an expansion of de-mining activities; and a regional approach to the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons throughout former Yugoslavia. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#24" target="notes"><sup><b>24</sup></b></a>
<p>
Taking into consideration the above objectives and benchmarks, the international community initiated a number of measures to promote returns and repatriation and to build confidence among the communities in the country to facilitate returns to minority areas.
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4b"><h3>Measures Initiated</h3></a>
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4b1"><h4>Target Areas for Returns</h4></a>
<p>
At the Florence Mid-Term Review Conference of the DPA in June 1996, UNHCR initiated a programme to accelerate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes of origin through the designation of "Target Areas", where investment in shelter and infrastructure could be concentrated to help create additional absorption capacity. By the end of the year, UNHCR had designated 22 such Target Areas. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#25" target="notes"><sup><b>25</sup></b></a>
<p>
UNHCR considered the following factors for selecting the 22 Target Areas: communities with widespread damage to dwellings and local infrastructure; areas where investments to address the damage were lacking; areas where the return of former residents was feasible from a political and security standpoint; and the level of co-operation with local authorities to support the project. The objective was to make 37,000 damaged dwellings habitable, and the target number of displaced persons to benefit from the programme was 184,000. The designation of the Target Areas was intended to provide a practical guide to donors in terms of where their investments were likely to have the greatest impact and was not intended to preclude investment in other areas. The International Management Group (IMG) was entrusted the lead role to co-ordinate the programme. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#26" target="notes"><sup><b>26</sup></b></a> The majority of the Target Areas selected were in the Federation (19), due to the more extensive damage in the Entity and the lesser degree of co-operation offered by authorities in the RS Entity. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#27" target="notes"><sup><b>27</sup></b></a>
<p>
By the end of 1996, approximately 23,800 housing units had been made habitable within the 22 Target Areas. In addition, 88 schools, 43 clinics/hospitals, 60 water systems, and 47 electrical power systems were rehabilitated. However, despite UNHCR sponsored micro-credit projects with support from the World Bank, lack of employment opportunities in the Target Areas remained a significant factor constraining the return of displaced persons. Also, insufficient de-mining activities in the Target Areas hampered the reconstruction effort as well as farming activities, and will continue to do so during 1997 unless the problem is addressed. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#28" target="notes"><sup><b>28</sup></b></a>
<p>
Nonetheless, during 1996, the Target Areas project made possible the return of more than 100,000 internally displaced persons to their homes, who would have been otherwise living with friends or family, or temporarily occupying someone else's home. The great majority of those who benefited from the programme were members of the majority ethnic group in the areas targeted. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#29" target="notes"><sup><b>29</sup></b></a>
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4b2"><h4>Shelter Programmes</h4></a>
<p>
The shortage of housing in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a major obstacle to the return and reintegration of displaced persons during 1996 and threatens to continue as such for 1997. Data published by the World Bank and other economic assistance providers suggest that, during the war, 50 percent of the housing stock was damaged and 6 percent destroyed in the Federation, and 24 percent damaged and 5 percent destroyed in the RS Entity. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#30" target="notes"><sup><b>30</sup></b></a> The restoration of these damaged and destroyed housing to the pre-war level was estimated to cost between $3 and 4 billion. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#31" target="notes"><sup><b>31</sup></b></a> Donor commitments for reconstruction of housing for the three to four-year period after the DPA was signed amount to $693 million, including $230 million for 1996. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#32" target="notes"><sup><b>32</sup></b></a>
<p>
World Bank estimates indicate that half a million flats and houses were damaged or destroyed during the war, with municipalities along the former confrontation lines sustaining the bulk of the damage. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#33" target="notes"><sup><b>33</sup></b></a> During 1996, only 40,000 housing units were repaired through international assistance programmes. This effort led to the decrease of internally displaced persons housed in collective centres from 50,000 in December 1995 to less than 20,000 in December 1996. In addition, the shelter repair programmes eased the repatriation of 88,000 refugees and one third of internally displaced persons who were accommodated with host families were able to move to private accommodations. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#34" target="notes"><sup><b>34</sup></b></a>
<p>
Immediately after the DPA was signed, UNHCR began to address the shelter problem. It was quickly evident that most international assistance programmes and lending institutions would require a long lead-time to gear up their reconstruction efforts, and that concrete results would be slow to materialise. Since that delayed start would hamper the return process, UNHCR embarked on an unprecedented shelter effort with a self-help approach that was intended to be fast and economical.
<p>
UNHCR negotiated sub-agreements with several NGOs (the first of which was UMCOR, the United Methodist Committee on Relief) to purchase large quantities of basic building materials and deliver them through municipal officials to home-owners who would provide the labour. It was hoped that a relatively small initial investment would have a prompt effect in expanding the housing stock.
<p>
On 6 February 1996, UNHCR initiated a "Trust Fund for Shelter Materials in Bosnia and Herzegovina" in order to expand its existing shelter-material support programme to include urgent repair of housing. UNHCR requested $30 million for the trust fund - $25 million for the procurement and distribution of basic shelter material to returning internally displaced persons throughout the country, and $5 million for re-glazing of some 50,000 homes in Sarajevo. As much as possible, the building material were to be produced locally in order to enhance employment opportunities. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#35" target="notes"><sup><b>35</sup></b></a>The initial fund was later increased to $70 million. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#36" target="notes"><sup><b>36</sup></b></a>
<p>
The UNHCR shelter programme was meant to "kick-start" the repair and reconstruction effort, until larger reconstruction projects could be initiated by the World Bank, the European Union, and other development agencies. However, the reconstruction process did not gain the momentum expected during 1996, and by default UNHCR's shelter programme remained one of the largest projects in the housing sector, allowing the repair of some 17,000 units. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#37" target="notes"><sup><b>37</sup></b></a> Another major contributor to the reconstruction of housing was US Agency for International Development (USAID) with $25 million allocated during 1996, of which about $24 million were spent for the repair of 2,548 houses in 48 villages throughout the Federation, permitting the return of 10,000 displaced persons. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#38" target="notes"><sup><b>38</sup></b></a>
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4b3"><h4>Coalition for Return - A Promising Development</h4></a>
<p>
A promising development during 1996 was the formation of the Coalition for Return, a multi-ethnic movement of displaced persons from all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Coalition for Return's aim is to lobby for the creation of an environment conducive to the return of all displaced persons - regardless of their nationality - to their homes of origin. The Coalition was established on the initiative of Deputy High Representative Ambassador Michael Steiner in Sarajevo in October 1996. Representatives of displaced persons were urged by Ambassador Steiner to form a forum to counterbalance the nationalist-separatist political agendas of the ruling political parties. Within five months, the Coalition managed to organise a network spanning both Entities, the neighbouring countries, and refugee host-countries in Western Europe, including approximately 70 displaced persons associations representing tens of thousand individuals.
<p>
The Coalition for Return has met with local authorities to persuade them to comply with the provisions of Annex 7 of DPA, and to promote the safe and voluntary return of all displaced persons to their homes of origin. A representative of Coalition for Return told ICG: "Until now, the political parties have been pressured only from the 'outside' - by people on whom they did not rely for support. The Coalition for Return can be more effective by pressuring from the 'inside.' If the displaced persons of various communities take up the return issue themselves, local authorities will have to respond because their political support depends on the local community, including the displaced."
<p>
The Coalition for Return has also focused on bringing displaced persons in contact with other displaced persons currently residing in their homes. The Coalition for Return has organised fact-finding visits to identify areas of the country where return is most feasible.
<p>
The Coalition for Return is in the process of consolidating relevant information which will serve to bridge the gaps on questions and issues relevant to displaced persons. Such research could be valuable sources of objective and unbiased information for displaced persons, thus enabling them to make informed choices about returning to their homes or remaining in their temporary areas of residence.
<p>
The Coalition for Return has organised three major conferences in Banja Luka, Mostar and Tuzla, focusing on strategies for return and repatriation during 1997. The following projects have either been initiated or will be in 1997: (1) the opening of four regional offices in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar and Tuzla; (2) identification of viable areas for returns; (3) provision of information to internally displaced persons and refugees, especially in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, through a monthly bulletin; (4) establishment of a strategy planning group to provide information to international organisations and relevant authorities; (5) initiation of a self-help home repair programme; (6) expansion of a weekly television programme dedicated to issues relevant to displaced persons; (7) appointment of three journalists - one from each ethnic group - to act as the Coalition's spokespersons; (8) appointment of a team to disseminate information to displaced persons in the country as well as abroad; (9) establishment of links with organisations providing legal aid and information to internally displaced persons and refugees; (10) initiation of a lobbying effort to pressure Entity authorities to repeal discriminatory legislation; and (11) promotion of the return of displaced persons as a major issue during the September 1997 municipal elections.
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4b4"><h4>ZOS Return Procedures</h4></a>
<p>
One of the clearest prisms through which to understand the dangerous deadlock over so-called "minority returns" is the "ZOS returns" programme. This has been a high-profile 10-month effort by the international community to support Bosniac attempts to return to pre-war properties on the RS Entity side of the IEBL, inside the ZOS. Because the organised return by Bosniacs to homes deeper inside the RS Entity has been totally blocked, the emphasis on return to the ZOS has been all the more intense. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#39" target="notes"><sup><b>39</sup></b></a> The ZOS return project has been deeply troubled.
<p>
ZOS returns began in February 1996, when a handful of displaced persons ventured back to their houses in the suburbs of Omerbegovaca and Dizdarusa, on the southern outskirts of Brcko. They had been emboldened by the recent arrival of US troops who had just established a commanding presence in the Brcko area. With the Americans present, the returnees perceived an implicit zone of safety where the RS Entity police were under close observation and presumably would not dare harass the returnees.
<p>
Indeed, although the atmosphere was tense, the first returnees encountered no major security problems. On 11 April, however, a new dynamic became evident. Federation authorities began to try to expand and accelerate the fledgling Brcko-area ZOS return by delivering basic building materials to Omerbegovaca. The materials were not given to the pioneer families, who were getting by on their own at the survival level, but rather were used by Bosniac construction crews to begin roofing other houses in the area. The roofing crews were deployed only on the RS Entity side of the IEBL. Accordingly, the Bosnian Serbs perceived the assistance not as a humanitarian effort but as an attempt to establish "facts on the ground".
<p>
The RS Entity authorities quickly responded by dispatching building crews and materials to start roofing shattered houses on the Bosnian Serb side of the IEBL to make them inhabitable for Bosnian Serbs who had been displaced to Brcko. Thus began a close-quarters Bosniac-Serb "housing race".
<p>
Fearing conflict between the Bosniacs and Bosnian Serbs, IFOR commanders in Brcko imposed a two-week moratorium on construction in mid-June. Meanwhile, UNHCR had been implementing a "self-help" assistance programme, giving basic building materials to returnees, outside the ZOS, and was trying to frame a programme that would be workable in the ZOS as well. Because of the obvious potential for renewed conflict, IFOR and UNHCR asked the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to take the lead in establishing ground-rules for managing what was clearly becoming an explosive situation.
<p>
On 3 July 1996 OHR, UNHCR, IFOR, and IPTF representatives met in Bijeljina and drafted the first of several sets of guidelines for "phased" and "orderly" returns to the RS Entity side of the ZOS. The aim was to minimise the possibilities for conflict by establishing a screening process under which an International Housing commission (IHC) comprised of representatives from UNHCR, OHR, IFOR, and IPTF, would verify the pre-war link between each prospective returnee and the property in question. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#40" target="notes"><sup><b>40</sup></b></a>
<p>
The initial purpose was to defuse the situation near Brcko by verifying that ZOS returns reflected a genuine displaced persons return movement and not a covert strategic move by the Federation to encroach on RS Entity territory at what was clearly a militarily sensitive location. The guidelines were simple. Only pre-war owners were to be cleared to return to the RS Entity side of the ZOS, and as an initial pacing measure, an arbitrary limit of 20 approvals for cross-IEBL returns per week was set as the target for the commission. Later some additional ground-rules evolved. For example, no applications from active military or police were to be approved. The returnees were also explicitly barred from bringing any weapons into the ZOS.
<p>
It was envisioned at the Bijeljina meeting that the Brcko model might be applied elsewhere in the ZOS, and that began to happen in July, first at Mahala and then at other villages in the ZOS in north-east Bosnia and Herzegovina such as Jusici and Gajevi. Although the procedures were updated and streamlined at least three times, most recently by the OHR in February 1997, the concept has not changed substantially, except to clarify that pre-war residence, not ownership, was the criteria for approval of an application. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#41" target="notes"><sup><b>41</sup></b></a>
<p>
Several aspects of the IHC process troubled those who devised it: avoiding any implication of a promise by the international community to assure the safety of the returnees; avoiding any implied promise that their needs for financial assistance would be automatically met as a result of the approval; and ensuring that returnees understood that once on RS Entity territory, they would be subject to RS Entity law.
<p>
IFOR insisted all along that although it would provide "area security" -- that is prevent the outbreak of hostilities -- it would not be responsible for guaranteeing the security of individuals. Hence the application forms filled out by prospective ZOS returnees have contained an explicit waiver acknowledging that there is no such guarantee. Similarly the applicants have had to acknowledge that being cleared to return to the ZOS does not carry any expectation of financial assistance.
<p>
Encouraged in some instances by Federation authorities, groups of prospective returnees began a series of organised moves into the Bosnian Serb side of the ZOS at points near Tuzla. In some cases Federation officials consulted international authorities before organised returns and the IHC procedures were followed, while in other cases the returns were launched overnight and were termed "spontaneous".
<p>
Villages such as Mahala, Jusici, Gajevi, and Stanic Rijeka became widely known during the summer and autumn of 1996 as Federation authorities tried to accelerate the returns, RS Entity authorities tried to stop them, and the international community tried to manage a "phased" and "orderly" process. There were a number of serious confrontations between Bosniac returnees and Bosnian Serb police and civilians, and an extended series of night-time dynamiting of Bosniac houses that were under repair.
<p>
The most dangerous of the clashes were the initial "spontaneous" move into Mahala in July and the armed confrontations at Gajevi in early November in which one Bosniac died and several were wounded. The most destructive of property were the dynamiting of nine houses under repair in Brod and Omerbegovaca on 11 November and the torching and dynamiting of 11 new prefab houses in Gajevi between 28 February and 11 March 1997.
<p>
One particularly convoluted incident occurred in October at Jusici, where the villagers moved "spontaneously," pre-empting the IHC process. Russian IFOR troops searched the houses and reported that someone had brought a dozen-odd hand grenades and a few rifles. This was a clear violation of the ZOS procedures and to make the point that security breaches of this nature would not be tolerated, US IFOR demanded that all the Jusici returnees leave the ZOS while the IHC screening procedure was implemented. At a high level meeting in Sarajevo, the other international members of the IHC policy group, including UNHCR, acceded to IFOR's demand.
<p>
That led to an incongruous test of will between the villagers and IFOR. IFOR imposed an embargo on Jusici, preventing the delivery of further supplies to the village during an especially cold and rainy week. The situation was frozen for several days while IFOR threatened officials in the Tuzla area with a complete cut-off of assistance. Finally the returnees moved out.
<p>
This crisis generated bitter commentary in the Bosnian media and a certain degree of tension within the international community over the hardball tactics used to discipline the villagers -- who after all had every right to return to Jusici. Some questioned whether it was necessary to have gone to such lengths to evict the villagers for 48 hours, only to screen them through the IHC and then allow them to move back <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#42" target="notes"><sup><b>42</sup></b></a>.
<p>
The ZOS has been a priority and an unending irritation for all involved, but for different reasons. To the villagers ZOS return simply means going home, albeit often to piles of rubble and fields strewn with land-mines. Since the DPA already promised them the right to return, the IHC process seemed an unnecessary, painfully slow and deeply frustrating impediment.
<p>
To Federation officials the ZOS is a target because it represents a two-kilometre strip of adjacent and hence easily accessible territory which is all the more important because minority returns have been impossible elsewhere in the RS Entity. But the fact that the areas chosen for return around Brcko, Doboj, Koraj and the Sapna Thumb are all militarily significant suggests Federation authorities also had a strategic motive.
<p>
RS Entity officials have been acutely sensitive to these moves because the ZOS would be their outer defence perimeter in case of renewed fighting. Moreover, freedom of movement across the IEBL would negate the fundamental point they have been trying to establish, that Bosnia and Herzegovina has been partitioned already, and that the IEBL is actually a formal boundary.
<p>
And finally, international organisations such as UNHCR have regarded the ZOS as a priority reluctantly, and by default. It is clearly a poor place to encourage safe and orderly returns. On the other hand, it is the only place where organised minority return has been conceivable up to this point. So they have been determined not to quit.
<p>
The international community has tried repeatedly to streamline and rationalise the IHC screening mechanism, but the process has remained extremely time-consuming and the actual returns have been minimal. In the past year some 4,500 applications have been approved under the IHC procedure, covering about 10,000 people, but according to UNHCR, only 811 Bosniacs have returned to the RS Entity side of the ZOS as of March 1997, and only 211 using the IHC procedures. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#43" target="notes"><sup><b>43</sup></b></a> The initial aim of the ZOS procedures was to demonstrate phased, orderly small-scale returns as a step toward broader minority returns, but the objective still appears remote. As the backlog grows, the pressure and the sense of absurdity mounts, leading many internationals who are involved in the ZOS return process to question its point.
<p>
In the absence of a more determined SFOR effort to ensure security, the ZOS return programme is in deep trouble. The lengthening list of IHC approvals is quantifiable, but it is far from being a sign of progress in implementing the DPA provisions for return. Nearly all those who have returned to the RS Entity ZOS are living in grim conditions, generally without electricity or running water, and subject to various forms of harassment. The fact remains that the ZOS is a former front-line area, laced with minefields and wrecked houses, which could easily become a battlefield again. It is a focus for return because it is accessible, not because it is at this time a healthy place to live, plough fields or invest.
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4b5"><h4>Pilot Projects Within the Federation</h4></a>
<p>
On 2 November 1995 at Dayton, President Alija Izetbegovic and then-Federation President Kresimir Zubak signed an agreement for the voluntary return of 600 families to "Pilot Project" towns in the Federation - 100 Bosnian Croat families to Bosniac-controlled Travnik, 200 Bosniac families to Bosnian Croat-controlled Jajce, 100 Bosniac families to Bosnian Croat-controlled Stolac, and 200 Bosnian Croat families to Bosniac-controlled Bugojno. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#44" target="notes"><sup><b>44</sup></b></a> Other similar projects were to be initiated during the year. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#45" target="notes"><sup><b>45</sup></b></a> These returns within the first four Pilot Project areas were deemed to have been a confidence-building measure, and were to be completed by 8 December 1995. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#46" target="notes"><sup><b>46</sup></b></a> However, the Pilot Projects proved to be highly labour intensive and highlighted the complexity of return movements to minority areas.
<p>
By March 1996, the Travnik project had almost been completed, and substantial progress was made in Jajce with half the projected number of families having returned. However, after six weeks of intensive negotiations facilitated by UNHCR, OHR, representatives of the US, and the Federation Mediator, not one family had been able to return to Stolac. The Bugojno project was equally unsuccessful. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#47" target="notes"><sup><b>47</sup></b></a>
<p>
A year later, the Pilot Projects were completed only in Travnik and Jajce. But even in those towns, "persistent difficulties … suggest that the safety of returning refugees has yet to be satisfactorily guaranteed." <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#48" target="notes"><sup><b>48</sup></b></a> The projects were stalled in Stolac and Bugojno. In Stolac, even though 110 families were permitted to work on the repair of their homes in September, <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#49" target="notes"><sup><b>49</sup></b></a> the project has been confronted by numerous obstacles principally owing to opposition by the mayor, and has been suspended on numerous occasions. In Bugojno, as of the end of March 1997, only 128 out of the projected 200 families had been able to return, <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#50" target="notes"><sup><b>50</sup></b></a> and a number of the returning Bosnian Croats were forced to leave due to serious harassment. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#51" target="notes"><sup><b>51</sup></b></a> The Bugojno project was finally completed in late April.
<p>
Owing to the insignificant results produced by the Pilot Projects even 17 months past their one month completion deadline, and the inordinate amount of time, effort and resources required, the projects were not expanded.
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4b6"><h4>Organised Assessment Visits</h4></a>
<p>
In the spring of 1996, pressures built in places like Celic and Rahic where there were large numbers of displaced persons wanting to return to their nearby homes in towns such Brcko and Koraj. UNHCR tried to break the ice for such returns by organising "assessment" visits in which busloads of Bosniacs would return for a brief visit to see what had become of their former properties. But although UNHCR persuaded the parties to sign a joint agreement authorising such visits, very few of the visits were successful. The effort to arrange them proved extremely time-consuming for UNHCR protection officers as local officials refused to co-operate. Several visits were blocked by hostile crowds throwing stones and screaming obscenities. Sometimes the damaged homes of displaced persons on a list for an assessment visit were further demolished.
<p>
In July 1996, UNHCR presented to the Parties a list of eight municipalities <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#52" target="notes"><sup><b>52</sup></b></a> whose authorities had been particularly obstinate and obstructive of organised assessment visits by displaced persons. On 21 August, UNHCR was informed by these authorities that the lack of co-operation was due to a "misunderstanding" and that they were now instructed to co-operate. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#53" target="notes"><sup><b>53</sup></b></a>
<p>
Nonetheless, the expected co-operation did not materialise and in general obstructionism continued. These organised assessment visits were often counter-productive in terms of "confidence-building" since local authorities on both side attempted to turn them into political demonstrations. Most importantly, a negligible number of displaced persons were able to return to their homes as a result of such visits.
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4b7"><h4>Bus Services</h4></a>
<p>
By late spring of 1996, it was obvious to UNHCR that the assessment visit strategy was not working and that the dividing lines between the entities were hardening into de facto borders. It was equally clear that tens of thousands of "minority" Bosnians desperately wanted to cross the lines to visit their former towns, get in contact with family members and friends, find out whether their former houses were still standing and, if so, who was occupying them.
<p>
In perhaps its boldest experiment, UNHCR decided to open a free bus service on routes to the Sarajevo Serb suburbs and between cities such as Banja Luka and Drvar, Tuzla and Bijeljina, and Sarajevo and Gorazde. UNHCR began this program with considerable trepidation because it was clear there might be harassment and attacks on the buses. There were indeed some problems on a number of routes initially, but overall the bussing program was a success. The buses were often filled to capacity and the frequently emotional response of the riders made clear that beneath the surface of the inter-community cold wars, there remains a pool of "normal people" who resist the nationalists' program of ethnic segregation.
<p>
The safety of the bussing experiment was of high concern at the start, and this was an area where IFOR took special measures to assure security. The initial runs on some routes were escorted by IFOR and IPTF, and were monitored from the air. Bosnian Serb authorities in some areas such as Banja Luka initially resisted the buses on the grounds that the service had not received prior authorisation, that the drivers were not licensed in the RS Entity, and the buses were uninsured. At one point, a British IFOR commander in Banja Luka dispatched armoured vehicles to an especially troublesome Bosnian Serb checkpoint with orders to attach hooks to the police cars and drag them away. This put a definitive end to the resistance at that location. Over time the harassment subsided.
<p>
The service was sub-contracted to the Danish Refugee Council. By the end of the year, 11 such bus lines were in operation, providing transportation to up to 1,000 passengers per day wishing to visit their places of origin. UNHCR intended to transfer this service to a commercial operation, but security concerns have so far prevented the implementation of this intention. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#54" target="notes"><sup><b>54</sup></b></a>
<p>
Despite the efforts of local authorities, in particular Bosnian Serbs and Croats, to obstruct the bus service, some 283,000 passengers have used the buses as of April 1997. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#55" target="notes"><sup><b>55</sup></b></a> The annual cost of this service has been approximately $1.3 million. While the impact of the bus service on actual numbers of minority returns is impossible to determine, there is no doubt that it was an important confidence-building effort and promoted freedom of movement across the former confrontation lines.
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4b8"><h4>Municipalities Blacklisted by OHR</h4></a>
<p>
On 18 April 1996 Principal Deputy High Representative Ambassador Michael Steiner informed the authorities of the Federation and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina that four municipalities -- Bosnian Croat-controlled Stolac and Capljina, and Bosniac-controlled Bugojno and Vares -- were only entitled to humanitarian support and would no longer receive any "financial resources from shared taxes and transfers", including reconstruction aid. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#56" target="notes"><sup><b>56</sup></b></a> These four municipalities were singled out because they had failed to convene interim municipal assemblies (IMAs) by a specified date as required and agreed in the Sarajevo Agreement on the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 30 March 1996. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#57" target="notes"><sup><b>57</sup></b></a> This blacklist was not directly related to the return of displaced persons since the municipalities only needed to convene an IMA for the sanctions to be withdrawn. Nevertheless, the matter was linked since the refusal of the parties in power to co-operate with minority party representatives was a powerful deterrent to minority returns.
<p>
No formal study of the effectiveness of the above sanctions policy has been carried out. However, international officials monitoring events in the four municipalities report that the blacklist has had minimal impact and, critically, IMAs are yet to be convened. Depriving Capljina of reconstruction aid appears to have had no effect whatsoever, since the economy is already performing comparatively well and, in any case, finance comes from Croatia. Stolac too benefits from close economic links with Croatia, though the economic outlook there is somewhat less healthy. Bugojno and Vares are in obvious need of economic assistance, but even in these municipalities, attitudes remain generally hard-line. In Vares, for example, Bosnian Croats who had repaired their homes and intended to return there permanently found that the authorities were allocating their property to Bosniac families. Only in Bugojno has there been any kind of return of Bosnian Croats in a belated effort to fulfil pilot project targets.
<p>
An oft-cited criticism of the sanctions policy against the four municipalities is that other municipalities behave equally badly, and possibly worse, yet are not penalised in the same manner: in Mostar for example, there is considerably less compliance with the DPA. Moreover, other municipalities formally convened IMAs to fulfil the minimum requirements of the Sarajevo Agreement, but the IMAs never met again. In essence, there is a perceived lack of consistency in the policy.
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4b9"><h4>Repatriation Information Reports</h4></a>
<p>
In January 1996, the international community recognised that an important factor for promoting returns, repatriation, and other durable solutions for internally displaced persons and refugees was access to accurate and up-to-date information on conditions in the intended areas of return and relocation. In early 1996, UNHCR set up a repatriation information unit in Sarajevo, supported by the regional offices, and initiated the publication of "Repatriation Information Reports" (RIR) on individual municipalities covering the following topics: political and security conditions, housing, registration procedures, routes and means of transportation, documentary requirements, pertinent legal developments, infrastructure, public utilities, public/social services, economic activities, and available assistance programmes. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#58" target="notes"><sup><b>58</sup></b></a>
<p>
By October 1996, UNHCR had issued Repatriation Information Reports on 72 municipalities in both Entities, and translated them into the local languages. The reports were made available in all refugee host-countries and were posted on the Internet. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#59" target="notes"><sup><b>59</sup></b></a> However, due to rapid developments on the ground, the RIRs were often outdated shortly after publication. In addition, the reports were not distributed as widely as intended. Ultimately, the programme proved to be too costly, and the reports were of little use to displaced persons. UNHCR discontinued the programme in December.
<p>
In December 1996, UNHCR gave $600,000 to a new initiative - the Repatriation Information Centre (RIC) - run primarily by SFOR. The RIC was intended to "serve as a clearing house for the sharing of information between governments and organisations concerned, to ensure that repatriation is planned taking due account of shelter absorption capacity, ongoing reconstruction efforts, the availability of basic social infrastructure, as well as security and human rights factors affecting repatriation." <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#60" target="notes"><sup><b>60</sup></b></a> However, the first draft reports available in April (not officially published) contained some misleading information; clearly, accuracy will continue to be a problem. Moreover, there are no plans to translate the reports into the local languages.
<p>
<p align="right"><a href="#top"><img src="../../../images/contents.gif" width="61" height="27" alt="Contents" border="0"></a></p><p><a name="4c"><h3>Regional Perspective</h3></a>
<p>
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are hosts to more than three million refugees, internally displaced persons, and other war affected populations. In addition to 160,000 Bosnian refugees in Croatia, the country has between 100,000 and 140,000 internally displaced persons, mainly from Eastern Slavonia. And the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is host to 566,000 Serb refugees, including 253,000 from Bosnia and Herzegovina. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#61" target="notes"><sup><b>61</sup></b></a> Some 48,000 ethnic Serb refugees from Krajina and western Slavonia are currently in the RS Entity, and many more from Eastern Slavonia may move to the RS Entity. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#62" target="notes"><sup><b>62</sup></b></a>
<p>
It has been evident since the beginning of the wars in the former Yugoslavia that the criss-cross pattern of refugee exodus cannot be reversed without an extraordinary effort on a regional scale. Due to the massive destruction of housing, the displaced people of the region are trapped in a virtual gridlock of forced population movements. The defenders of ethnic homogeneity will find it easy to continue to block minority returns by pointing to the need of their displaced majority populations for shelter.
<p>
The country, key to any regional strategy, in which it may be possible to break the logjam and kick-start the return process is Croatia. Great swathes of territory in Krajina which were formerly inhabited by Serbs are now largely depopulated. Though much of the housing stock was systematically torched after Croatia's 1995 offensives and some displaced Croats have moved in, there, nevertheless, remains more available accommodation there than anywhere else in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, any initiative which concentrates on the plight of Serb refugees should boost the Serb community's confidence in the international community and generate momentum for returns within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
<p>
Critically, of all the former belligerents Croatia is generally the most susceptible to international pressure. It is the newest member of the Council of Europe and aspires eventually to join NATO. It is also seeking a $500-million loan to reconstruct its economy from the International Monetary Fund and is already a recipient of US development aid. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#63" target="notes"><sup><b>63</sup></b></a> Moreover, international pressure has already yielded some results. Earlier this month, for example, Croatia adopted as policy recommendations developed by UNHCR and the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) for equal treatment and equal access to Croatian government programmes. <a href="../../../projects/bosnia/reports/footnotes/bh22n.html#64" target="notes"><sup><b>64</sup></b></a> As a result, displaced Croats and displaced Croatian citizens of other ethnic groups who wish to return home are now declared to have equal legal status as "returnees" in Eastern Slavonia, though not in other parts of Croatia.
<p>
Nevertheless, Croatia frequently falls short of its commitments. In order to be admitted to the Council of Europe, Croatia had to honour a list of fourteen conditions drawn up by the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly and Committee of Ministers. These included the protection of the rights of Serbs in Croatia and facilitating the return of Serb refugees to the Krajina - conditions which to date Croatia has failed to honour. The international community must insist that Croatia lives up to its obligations as a member of the Council of Europe and further pressure all governments in the region to respect the rights of minorities to return home and live in security.
<p>
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